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VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS AND THE CONSTRAINTS 
IMPOSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
Paula Bird1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“If we don’t stand up for children, then we don’t stand for much.”2  This     
sentiment is a resounding example of how we, as a society, feel about the          
protection of our children.  Stories of the abuse and exploitation of children strike 
at our hearts, and move us to safeguard those who are vulnerable.  It provokes us to 
punish those who dare to harm them.  It comes as no surprise, then, that lawmakers 
have crafted stringent laws directed against the production, distribution, and      
possession of child pornography.3  Unfortunately, however, the easy accessibility 
and increasing popularity of the internet has cleared a path for computer crimes, 
including the distribution, possession, and, with the powers of computer animation, 
even creation of child pornography.4  
For well over a decade, legislation has been attempting to crack down on   
criminals who have used this method to distribute and/or possess child              
pornography.5  One of these legislative acts was the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996 which considered possession of virtual child pornography-             
pornography made with morphed computer images and without real children - a 
crime.6  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck down this Act in 2002, declaring 
that it was unconstitutional because of its infringement on the First Amendment.7  
Since then, legislation and the courts have continued to battle against virtual child 
pornography while attempting to adhere to the limitations of the First Amendment.8  
Recent developments in case law have once again called into question the   
constitutionality of laws surrounding child pornography.9  Obviously, reconciling 
the competing interests of the First Amendment with the prevention of the sexual 
exploitation of children has proven to be a struggle which has yet to be completely 
 ________________________  
 1. J.D., Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, 2011; B.S. in Psychology, University of 
Central Florida, 2007. 
 2. Marian Wright Edelman (The Founder and President of the Children Defense Fund).
 3. See generally Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, H.R. 3610 [hereinafter CPPA of 1996]; 
invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 2003 Stat. 151 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§§ 2252, 2252A, 2256 (2008) [hereinafter PROTECT Act of 2003]. 
 4. See Chelsea McLean, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 221 (Fall 2007) [hereinafter McLean]. 
 5. See generally Id. 
 6. CPPA of 1996, supra note 3. 
 7. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 8. See McLean, supra note 4. 
 9. See generally United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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won by either side.10  In light of this tension, this article seeks to navigate through 
the complexities involved with the uncertain future of virtual child pornography 
laws.  First, a brief history of the legislative actions and court rulings regarding 
unprotected speech and virtual child pornography will be set forth.  Then, a       
discussion of the current standing of child pornography laws will be presented.  
Entailed in this discussion will be a vigorous inspection of the current statutes and 
how they simultaneously affect law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants.  
Finally, the potential future of laws regarding virtual child pornography will be 
analyzed. This will necessarily include addressing the issues of how the            
application and interpretation of the laws are changing and how the Supreme Court 
might react to the criticisms of current legislation and case law. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
A. Forbidden Speech: Not all Speech is Protected 
The Constitution grants the American people with the freedom of speech.11  
However, it has long been recognized that the right of free speech is not an       
absolute right devoid of limitations and restrictions.12  As stated in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, a ground-breaking First Amendment case for its delineation of 
what constitutes forbidden speech, “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”13  Included within these punishable 
classes of speech are the lewd and obscene.14  
B. The Initial Reaction to the Burgeoning Industry of Child Pornography 
Unfortunately, laws prohibiting obscenity proved ineffective in eradicating the 
proliferating industry of child pornography because not all child pornography fit 
under the rubric of obscene materials.15  For example, in New York v. Ferber, the 
defendant, Ferber, sold two films portraying young boys masturbating.16  Had   
Ferber’s prosecution rested solely on laws prohibiting obscenity, he would have 
managed to evade conviction because the sexual act of masturbation, in and of  
itself, is not considered legally obscene.17  As a result, the Federal Government, as 
well as a majority of the States, began enacting laws that forbade the distribution of 
child pornography without the additional requirement that the material be legally 
obscene.18 The Supreme Court approved of such legislation in Ferber, determining 
 ________________________  
 10. See McLean, supra note 4. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 12. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 13. Id. at 571-72. 
 14. Id. at 572. 
 15. See S. Rep. No. 95-438 (1977). 
 16. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752 (1982).  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 749. 
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that: 1) the State’s interest in ensuring the physical and psychological welfare of 
children was “compelling;” 2) the distribution of child pornography is inherently 
intertwined with the sexual abuse of children; 3) the distribution of child           
pornography supplied an economic incentive and was therefore, a fundamental 
component of the production of such materials - an activity already recognized as 
illegal; 4) any value found in materials presenting children performing sexual acts 
was slight, if not de minimis; and 5) distinguishing child pornography as an       
unprotected class of speech was not “incompatible” with previous decisions.19  As 
a result of these findings, the Court held that child pornography involving an  
“element of scienter” and a visual portrayal of sexual conduct by children, and 
lacking any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, is not protected 
speech under the First Amendment.20 
Criminalizing the production and distribution of child pornography, while a  
valiant effort, proved insufficient to completely eliminate the market for child   
pornography.21  Rather, the market simply went underground to compensate for the 
attack on production and distribution, making it even more challenging to resolve 
the child pornography crisis.22  In response, Congress enacted legislation banning 
the mere possession, and not just production and distribution, of pornographic  
images of children.23  In Osborne v. Ohio, the defendant argued that state of Ohio 
could not constitutionally proscribe possession of child pornography since the  
Supreme Court had previously stated in Stanley v. Georgia,24 a case involving the 
possession of obscene materials, that “[w]hatever the power of the state to control 
public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot               
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s 
private thoughts.”25  The Court responded to Osborne’s claims by asserting that the 
State’s prohibition against possessing child pornography was not based on a     
“paternalistic interest” in controlling Osborne’s mind, as it was in Stanley, but was 
instead aimed at wiping out the exploitation of children.26  Accordingly, the      
Supreme Court further endorsed the efforts of legislation to stamp out child      
pornography by ruling that possession, and not just production and distribution, 
could also be criminalized.27   
C. …But Did Legislation Go Too Far? 
Despite these efforts, however, sexual exploitation of children continued to run 
rampant.28  In particular, the easy accessibility and increasing popularity of      
 ________________________  
 19. Id. at 756-64. 
 20. Id. at 764-65. 
 21. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 143. 
 24. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969).  
 25. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108-09. 
 26. Id. at 109. 
 27. Id. at 111. 
 28. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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computers created a wellspring for crimes, including the distribution, possession, 
and with the powers of computer animation, even creation of child pornography 
without actually utilizing children.29  In order to combat this new avenue made 
available to pedophiles to exploit children and evade conviction, Congress passed 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 which considered possession of 
virtual child pornography - pornography made with morphed computer images and 
without real children - a crime.30  In its findings, Congress determined that while 
virtual child pornography may not involve, and therefore, does no actual, physical 
harm to minors, these images still endanger children in indirect ways.31  For      
instance, pedophiles could use this material to convince children to engage in   
sexual activity by presenting the child with visual images portraying other children 
participating in sexual acts and enjoying such activity.32  Congress also found that 
virtual child pornography has the potential to “whet … [the] sexual appetites” of 
pedophiles, thus further fostering the creation and distribution of child pornography 
and the sexual abuse of real children.33  Finally, Congress recognized that as    
technology continued to advance, it would become more difficult to verify that 
images contain real children, thereby supplying a viable defense which could be 
used by pedophiles to escape prosecution.34 
Eventually, opposition to the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
caught the attention of the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.35  
The Court countered each of Congress’s individual findings.36  First, while it was 
conceded that virtual child pornography may indeed be employed by pedophiles to 
lure children, the Court asserted that there are many other things innocent in   
themselves, such as cartoons, toys, and candy, which could be used for the same 
inappropriate purposes and yet it would not be expected for those items to be    
prohibited.37  As to virtual child pornography whetting the appetites of pedophiles, 
the Court contended that the government could not constitutionally base legislation 
on the “mere tendency” of speech to promote illegal acts.38  The Court emphasized 
that laws aimed at controlling the thoughts of individuals are impermissible,     
specifically stating that “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and 
speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of 
thought.”39  Concerning Congress’s final claim regarding the difficulties imposed 
on prosecutors to prove that a real child, and not a virtual child, was used, the 
Court argued that suppressing lawful speech (pornography using a digital image) as 
a means to suppress unlawful speech (pornography using real children) cannot be 
 ________________________  
 29. Id. at 239-40. 
 30. CPPA of 1996, supra note 3. 
 31. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 242. 
 35. Id. at 239. 
 36. See Id. at 250-58. 
 37. Id. at 251. 
 38. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253. 
 39. Id.  
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tolerated.40  All in all, the Court determined that laws proscribing virtual child  
pornography were overbroad and infringed upon the First Amendment rights of 
individuals.41  
III. CURRENT STANDING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
A. The PROTECT Act 
With the demands placed by Free Speech Coalition, Congress rushed to craft 
legislation which would adhere to the restrictions placed by the First Amendment 
but would not compromise the objective of the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
of 1996.  They came up with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), a compilation of 
statutes aimed at preventing child abuse.42   The PROTECT Act, encompassing 18 
U.S.C. §2252, 18 U.S.C. §2252A, and 18 U.S.C. §2256, prohibits the creation, 
distribution, and possession of child pornography.43  Under these statutes, child 
pornography is described as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct that 
includes: a) a minor, b) a digital or computer image that is “indistinguishable” from 
that of a real minor, or c) an image which has been created or modified to appear to 
be that of an “identifiable minor” engaging in sexually explicit conduct.44  An 
“identifiable minor” is defined as either a person who was under the age of      
eighteen at the time the visual image was created or whose image as a minor was 
employed in creating or modifying the visual image and that person is recognizable 
as an actual person through the person’s face or some other distinctive               
characteristic.45  A digital or computer image that is “indistinguishable” from that 
of a real minor is described as being “virtually indistinguishable,” in that an      
ordinary person viewing such image would come to the conclusion that the image 
is of a real child.46  It is specifically stated that this definition excludes “depictions 
that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults.”47  
B. An Avenue of Escape for Defendants 
These subsequent alterations to child pornography supplied pedophiles with the 
ammunition to avoid prosecution and, for those who had already been convicted, to 
appeal their convictions.  In United States v. Ellyson, the defendant was convicted 
of possession of child pornography under the provisions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 after several computer disks containing sexually explicit 
images of children of children, as well as other materials, were discovered at his 
 ________________________  
 40. Id. at 255. 
 41. Id. at 258. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 2252; 18 U.S.C. § 2252A; 18 U.S.C. § 2256. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11). 
 47. Id. 
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home.48  Ellyson appealed his conviction on the basis that the jury instruction   
defined child pornography as “any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit       
conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
. . . engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or such visual depiction is, or appears to 
be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”49  With this argument,     
Ellyson successfully managed to have his conviction vacated and remanded      
because of the possibility that he was convicted on the basis of possessing “virtual” 
child pornography not containing an actual child, since the government did not 
establish that a real child was harmed in making the images.50 
The current parameters of child pornography laws are further explained by the 
decision in United States v. Hilton.51  Hilton was convicted for possession of child 
pornography under the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.52  He appealed 
his conviction, maintaining that the prosecution offered no proof that the           
paraphernalia brought into evidence contained images of “actual” children and, 
therefore, the images could simply be composed of fictitious, computer-generated 
children, the possession of which is not illegal.53  Hilton’s conviction was         
vacated.54 The court concluded that in order to maintain a conviction against a  
defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the image or images  
contain actual children.55  It was emphasized that the government is not discharged 
of its burden of proof merely because a defendant neglects to make an argument or 
because of a lack of evidence suggesting the possible “artificiality” of the children 
presented.56  Providing proof that the visual depictions utilize real children is an 
element of the crime of possession, as well as production and distribution, of child 
pornography which must be satisfied by the prosecution and which should not be 
transferred to the defendant as an affirmative defense.57 
C. The Burden on the Prosecution 
These new strictures placed on the government had not only legal, but also 
practical consequences.  After all, taking into consideration that Congress itself 
made a finding that “new photographic and computer imaging technologies make it 
possible to produce . . . visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting 
viewer from un-retouched photographic images of actual children,”58 how can 
prosecutors prove that an image is abusing a real child versus a computer-generated 
 ________________________  
 48. United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 535. 
 51. United States v. Hilton, 386 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 52. Id. at 14. 
 53. Id. at 14-19. 
 54. Id. at 14. 
 55. Id. at 18. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. I, § 121 (1)(5), 110 Stat. 
3009-26. (emphasis added). 
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creation?  This triggered law enforcement to formulate some feasible solution.  The 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s (NCMEC) Child Victim 
Identification Program (CVIP) operates as the “national clearinghouse” for child 
pornography cases.59  Law enforcement agencies can submit copies of the seized 
images to CVIP and the evidence is analyzed.60  CVIP then returns a child        
identification report to the law enforcement agency, listing which children have 
been previously identified as real children.61  With prosecutors scrambling to verify 
the actual identity of the children in the images so that there is no doubt as to 
whether the visual depictions are real or creations, CVIP has performed a vital role 
in convictions.62 However, while CVIP has indeed proved to be a great resolution 
in identifying the realness of the victims, with the continuing advancements in 
technology, it does not, and cannot, completely solve the problem of proving that 
an image is not just a computer-generated creation. 
D. Combining Obscenity Prohibitions with the PROTECT Act 
The legislative branches have made further attempts to combat the use of these 
defenses used by pedophiles by delving into the idea of including obscenity statutes 
in the PROTECT Act.63  Created in the PROTECT Act is a new statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§1466A, which employs the Miller standard for obscenity in cases involving     
sexually explicit images of children.64  Section 1466A prohibits images of minors 
that are “obscene,” regardless of whether the children are real and regardless of 
what form of media, whether it be drawings, paintings, sculptures, etcetera, and 
punishes those who violate the statute as if they had been convicted of a child   
pornography crime.65 Correspondingly, 18 U.S.C. §1462 prohibits the             
transportation of such materials as described in §1466A.66 
IV. THE FUTURE OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: COULD THE 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS BE CHANGING? 
A. The First Signs of Leniency from the Courts 
Although Free Speech Coalition certainly limits the abilities of Congress and 
of law enforcement to convict creators, distributors, and possessors of child      
pornography, courts actually seem almost unwilling to allow those indicted with 
 ________________________  
 59. Michelle K. Collins, Child Pornography: A Closer Look, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2007, available at 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org./magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction =display&article_id=1139&issue_id=32007.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Brian G. Slocum, VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: DOES IT MEAN THE END OF THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 693 (2004). 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. §1466A (2003); See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (stating that “[a]t a 
minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary,  
artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection”). 
 65. Id.  
 66. 18 U.S.C. §1462 (1996). 
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these charges to escape conviction based upon the defense that the child or children 
are not real.67 United States v. Irving, decided by the Second Circuit, is one such 
recent case demonstrating the slackening restrictions that courts are imposing on 
the government in establishing its case against pedophiles.68  The defendant was a 
school physician convicted under the PROTECT Act for possession of seventy-six 
video files of child pornography, as well as several other heinous child sexual 
abuse charges.69  He appealed his conviction, insisting that the holding in Free 
Speech Coalition essentially created a “bright-line rule” which requires the      
prosecution to offer evidence, other than just the images themselves, to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that real children were abused in the images.70  The 
Second Circuit rejected this argument, stating, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court 
noted the possible evidentiary difficulty of distinguishing virtual and actual child 
pornography, it did not establish a bright-line rule requiring that the government 
proffer a specific type of proof to show the use of an actual child.”71  In effect, the 
court essentially upheld a jury verdict convicting the defendant of possession of 
child pornography based on videos where the government offered no proof beyond 
the videos themselves that the images were of real children.72  
Other Circuits have followed suit in relaxing the constraints placed on       
prosecutors to establish that an actual child exists.  In the First Circuit case, United 
States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, the defendant, Rodriguez-Pacheco, was sentenced to 
thirty months imprisonment, followed by a three year supervised release after he 
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography as governed under the 
PROTECT Act.73  In appealing the length of his sentence, Rodriguez-Pacheco 
urged the court to conclude that the prosecution must be required to produce expert 
testimony regarding the realness of a child in each image brought into evidence 
before the government is deemed to have met its burden of proof.74  The court  
decided that the premise of the defendant’s argument was erroneous.75  The court 
reasoned that the issue of whether or not an image was created with a non-virtual 
child is a question to be determined by the trier of fact, and as long as the         
Government presents enough of a showing – this could simply be the images  
themselves - to sway the trier of fact, then expert testimony is not an absolute   
requirement.76 
 ________________________  
 67. See generally United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez-
Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Hoey, 508 F.3d 687 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 68. Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 121. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 120-22. 
 73. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434 at 436 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 437. 
 76. Id. at 438; See Hoey, 508 F.3d 687 (1st Cir. 2007). 
8
Barry Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol16/iss1/5
Spring 2011 Virtual Child Pornography 169 
 
B. United States v. Whorley: The First Case of its Kind 
The lenient stance that several lower courts have taken in these cases, however, 
does not compare to the glaring disregard of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Free 
Speech Coalition, as does the case of United States v. Whorley.77  In this case, a 
federal appeals panel affirmed the holding that child pornography is unlawful even 
if the pictures are simply drawn, in the first conviction since the passing of the 
2003 federal statute against such cartoons.78  Whorley was sentenced to twenty 
years imprisonment after being found guilty of knowingly receiving twenty      
Japanese anime-style cartoons portraying children engaging in sexually explicit 
acts, receiving fourteen digital photographs with minors engaging in sexually   
explicit acts, and sending, as well as receiving, twenty explicit emails about      
fantasies of child molestation.79  To be precise, he was charged for being in       
violation of the PROTECT Act, specifically under sections 1462, 2252(a)(2), and 
1466A(a)(1), respectively, of the Act.80 On his appeal, Whorley made several   
contentions, namely that §1462 and §1466A(a)(1) are facially unconstitutional.81  
As previously mentioned, §1462 is the prohibition of importing and transporting, 
including knowingly receiving, obscene items through the use of “any express 
company or other common carrier or interactive computer service for carriage in 
interstate of foreign commerce.”82  Likewise, §1466A proscribes obscene visual 
depictions showing the sexual abuse of children, expressly including drawings, 
cartoons, sculptures, and paintings which appear to be of a child, as viable forms 
of media covered under the statute.83  Section 1466A also proceeds to specifically 
state that it is “not a required element . . . that the minor depicted actually          
exist[s].”84  Whorley contended that based on the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Free Speech Coalition, although defamation, incitement, obscenity, and            
pornography produced with actual children are not protected under the First 
Amendment, a proscription against non-obscene items which do not use real    
children is “impermissibly overbroad.”85  The Fourth Circuit responded by        
concluding that in spite of the fact that §1466A(a)(1) does not require an actual 
child, the inclusion of the requirement in the statute that the image be obscene is 
sufficient to make it constitutional because the statute is then technically geared to 
 ________________________  
 77. See generally Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 78. The Associated Press, 4th Circuit upholds law against cartoon child porn, Dec. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=21040 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 79. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 330. 
 80. See generally 18 U.S.C. §1462, 18 USC §2252(a)(2), 18 USC §1466A(a)(1). 
 81. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 330. 
 82. 18 U.S.C. §1462. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. §1466A (“Any person who . . . knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with 
intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that-- 
(1)(A) depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) is obscene; or  (2)(A) depicts an image that 
is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite 
sex; and (B) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value . . . shall be subject to the penalties      
provided in section 2252A(b)(1) . . .”). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. §1466A(c). 
 85. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 336. 
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prohibit obscene speech, rather than child pornography.86  Thus, §1466A(a)(1)  
escapes the requirement set out by the Supreme Court that there be an actual child 
victim in the image by posing as a restriction on obscene speech, rather than a  
restriction on child pornography.87  
However, not all the judges in this case were of the same opinion that §1466A 
retained its validity by shifting the focus from child pornography to obscenity.88  In 
fact, Circuit Judge Gregory, in his dissent, was of the strong opinion that Whorley 
had a valid argument.89  He led off his robust support for Whorley’s claim of the 
unconstitutionality of the statutes, stating that, “freedom of speech is ‘the highest 
aspiration of the common people.’ Indeed, ‘[o]ur whole constitutional heritage 
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds,’ and 
simply because ‘society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for 
suppressing it.’”90  Judge Gregory did concede that even with the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to impose a complete ban on virtual child pornography, it is still possible 
for an individual to be convicted on the ability of a jury to make a finding that  
cartoons of fictitious children are obscene.91  Nevertheless, he wrote at length about 
the difficulties inherent with determining what is actually obscene.92  He expressed 
his concern that the amorphous qualities of obscenity requirements make it a near 
impossibility to meet the level of proof required in the criminal sector.93  He 
averred that, as it stands, the Government is required to prove not only that the 
“material appeal[s] to the prurient interest and that it . . . [is] patently offensive, but 
also ‘call[s] on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material was    
utterly without redeeming social value--a burden virtually impossible to discharge 
under our criminal standards of proof.’”94 
Additionally, Judge Gregory had a significantly different understanding of the 
language of §1466A compared to the majority.95  Disagreeing with the majority’s 
contention that the statute covers pornographic articles of both real and fictitious 
children, he insisted that a clear reading of §1466A(a)(1) demands that the        
pornographic image include an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit acts, for 
an individual to be charged with violating the statue.96  He denied the majority’s 
line of reasoning by first alleging that 18 U.S.C. §2232 describes a minor as any 
person under eighteen years old.97  A person, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
is characterized as a “living human being” and as “a human being . . . with legal 
 ________________________  
 86. Id. at 337. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Id. at 343-53 (Gregory, Cir. Judge, dissenting and concurring). 
 89. See Id. 
 90. Id. at 343.  
 91. Id. at 347. 
 92. See Whorley, 550 F.3d at 343-53. 
 93. Id. at 344. 
 94. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 344 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 22). 
 95. Id. at 351. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol16/iss1/5
Spring 2011 Virtual Child Pornography 171 
 
rights and duties.”98  As such, “[a] child that is a figment of an illustrator’s        
imagination is not living, is not a human being with legal rights, and is certainly 
not natural in the legal sense of the word.”99 Therefore, following this line of 
thought, an individual’s conviction for receiving obscene, sexually explicit       
caricatures of actual persons under eighteen years old would be entirely             
appropriate, but a conviction for receiving obscene, sexually explicit drawings of 
completely fictitious children would be a wholly different matter.100  Moreover, 
Judge Gregory disputed the majority’s conclusion that §1466A(c), which states, 
“[i]t is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor   
depicted actually exist,”101 indicates that the government is not required to prove 
that the child shown in the image actually exists.102  Rather, he stressed the intent 
of subsection §1466A(c), that the evidentiary proof necessary for an individual to 
be found guilty be loosened by releasing the government from the insurmountable 
task of identifying and locating the child or children used in the production of the 
pornography and maintained that this did not mean that the child depicted could be 
entirely fictitious.103  Instead, for example, it was meant to prevent an individual 
from eluding conviction simply because a child did not “actually exist” in the sense 
that the child had passed away, or the child simply could not be identified even 
after an exhaustive search by law enforcement.104  
Judge Gregory concluded his championing of Whorley’s claims by expressing 
his deep concerns about the infringements placed on individuals’ First Amendment 
rights, declaring:  
Today, under the guise of suppressing obscenity -- whatever  
meaning that term may encompass -- we have provided the      
government with the power to roll back our previously inviolable 
right to use our imaginations to create fantasies.  It is precisely this 
unencumbered ability to fantasize that has allowed this nation to 
reap the benefits of great literary insight and scientific invention. 
The Constitution’s inviolable promise to us is its guarantee to     
defend thought, imagination and fantasy from unlawful              
governmental interference regardless of whether such thoughts, 
imaginings, or fantasies are popular with the masses.  It is in these 
moments that our grip on the rule of law and our fidelity to       
constitutional values is tested.105 
 ________________________  
 98. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE 
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 877 (1994); See also  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a  
person as “a human being”).  
 99. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 18 USC §1466A(c). 
 102. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 351. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 353. 
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Despite the support Whorley had from Judge Gregory, on December 18, 2008 
his convictions were affirmed.106  Whorley then filed a petition for rehearing en 
banc which was also firmly denied on June 15, 2009.107  Once again, however, he 
received further encouragement by Judge Gregory who urged Whorley to seek a 
grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court.108 Whorley took his advice and       
petitioned the Supreme Court to review his case.109  On January 11, 2010, the   
Supreme Court denied Whorley’s petition for writ of certiorari.110 
C. Others Question the Constitutionality of §1462 & §1466A of the 
PROTECT Act 
Although Whorley may have been the first to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§1462 and 18 U.S.C. §1466A, sections enacted as a way to avoid the limitations 
forced on 18 U.S.C. §2252 and 18 U.S.C. §2252A by the finding in Free Speech 
Coalition,111 other convictions, and as a result, a string of appeals, have sprung up 
in the wake of Whorley.  In United States v. Ryan, a Second Circuit case, the     
defendant appealed his conviction on the basis of the unconstitutionality of 18 
U.S.C. §1466A because the statute is overbroad.112  “Under the First Amendment’s 
overbreadth doctrine, ‘a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial 
amount of protected speech.’”113  Ryan attacked the validity of the statute by     
highlighting the fact that the statute extends to the mere possession of materials 
which do not involve real children and as such, there is no actual victim and    
therefore, no crime.114  The court, however, disagreed, citing that the fact that 18 
U.S.C. §1466A requires that the material be obscene is sufficient to protect it from 
being considered overbroad.115  
Likewise, in United States v. Mees, defendant Matthew Mees posed a similar 
argument to the Eighth Circuit challenging the constitutionality of 14 U.S.C. 
§1466A.116  Mees maintained that proscribing images depicting fictional characters 
cannot be enforced since characters in drawings have no age and, thus, it is not 
feasible to make an accurate determination of the definite age of a non-existent 
individual.117  As such, it is impractical to expect a jury to make a legitimate     
finding of fact concerning this issue at trial.118  The court responded by              
emphasizing that the issue of age is an element that the Government must prove 
 ________________________  
 106. Id. at 343. 
 107. United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009), denying reh’g to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 109. Whorley v. United States, 30 S.Ct. 1052 (2010), denying cert. to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258. 
 112. United States v. Ryan, No. 2:07-CR-35, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644, at *23(D. Vt. May 26, 2009). 
 113. Id. at 23-24 (citing United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008)).  
 114. Id. at 23. 
 115. Id. at 24. 
 116. United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145 ERW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 
10, 2009). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 3-4. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and simply because a jury may find it difficult to    
ascertain the age of a fictional character does not, by itself, make the statute      
unconstitutional.119  Still, Mees continued his defense by then asserting that an  
individual has a constitutional right to merely possess obscene materials.120  He 
delineated this claim by pointing to the fact that the Supreme Court has previously 
concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments entitle individuals to be free 
from prohibitions against the mere private possession of obscene materials.121  The 
court countered his claim, stating that the statute which the defendant is charged 
with and is currently challenging “does not make mere possession of obscene   
material a crime; rather, the statute requires some connection to interstate       
commerce.”122 Thus, the defendant is not simply being charged with the mere   
possession of obscene material.123 Instead, he has been charged with “possessing 
obscene material that was produced using materials that traveled in interstate 
commerce.”124 
D. The Plausibility of the Supreme Court Reviewing the Issue 
As it currently stands, these defendants have failed in their arguments to     
adequately contest the constitutionality of the §1466A portion of the PROTECT 
Act.  Nonetheless, with the fairly recent influx of cases, such as Whorley, Ryan, 
and Mees, which use §1466A as a way around the mandates of Free Speech     
Coalition, it is entirely plausible that the Supreme Court would want to review the 
issue.  It is also important to point out that even though there has been nearly a 
decade since the enactment of the PROTECT Act, there was a six-year span      
between the Child Pornography Prevention Act and the Supreme Court’s decision 
that it was unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition.  In fact, individuals in the 
forefront of the battle against the sexual exploitation of children suggest that the 
recent achievements of the prosecution of these pedophiles may not be as          
triumphant as it first seems.125  Justin Fitzsimmons, a former prosecutor and senior 
attorney with the National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse, disclosed 
reservations about the actual success or failure of these prosecutions since the cases 
have just begun to be challenged.126  Ernie Allen, the President of the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, also expressed the uncertainty of the 
future of child pornography laws and the prosecution of those violating them.127  
After all, while these prosecutorial and legislative efforts have proved triumphant 
so far in attaining convictions, many of these cases are still in the appellate 
 ________________________  
 119. Id. at 9. 
 120. Id. at 11-12.  
 121. Mees, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *12; see Stanley, 89 S. Ct. at 1249. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Ashley Broughten, Tennessee Man Charged in ‘Virtual Pornography’ Case, June 25, 2009,   
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/24/virtual.child.porn.   
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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process.128  With the continued perseverance of these defendants appealing their 
convictions by consistently disclaiming the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, 
their arguments are bound to capture the attention of the Supreme Court.  
E. Should the Supreme Court Review the Issue? 
As pointed out above, it is certainly plausible that with the recent arrival of 
cases prosecuted under §1466A of the PROTECT Act, the Supreme Court may 
want to review the constitutionality of the Act.  However, simply because it is a 
possibility that the Court may want to assess the situation, does not necessarily 
mean that the Court should, in fact, do so.  Therefore, the question must be asked, 
should the Supreme Court review the issue?  Clearly, there is a clash in the       
interpretation of the laws regarding virtual child pornography.  The Supreme Court 
previously made it clear in Free Speech Coalition that the First Amendment      
interests of individuals prevents a complete ban on child pornography which did 
not include real children.129 However, the moral reprehensibility inherent in the 
production and possession of such material, even though there is no real victim, 
makes it impossible for society to simply let it go unpunished.  As a result,        
legislation, as well as the lower courts, has found ways around the mandates set 
forth in the Supreme Court’s original ruling in Free Speech Coalition.130  The   
issues which have been introduced thus far indicate the vital need for the Supreme 
Court to re-evaluate how virtual child pornography should be dealt with, if for no 
other reason than to clear up the confusion and alleviate the frustration currently 
running rampant amongst law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants. A       
balance must be struck between our constitutional rights and our desire to protect 
our children.  And as such, it is imperative that the Supreme Court review the   
constitutionality of section 1466A of the PROTECT Act in order to guide how 
legislation and the lower courts should respond to virtual child pornography. 
F. If Reviewed, How Would the Supreme Court Resolve the Issue? 
If the Supreme Court does reanalyze this issue, will the PROTECT Act pass 
constitutional muster?  Does cloaking portions of this Act under the guise of     
obscenity laws protect it from being deemed unconstitutional, as the Child        
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was inevitably judged to be?  Because of the 
amorphous quality of what obscenity is composed of, it is impossible to predict.  
As Justice Brennan formerly noted, “[t]he problem is . . . that one cannot say with 
 ________________________  
 128. Id. 
 129. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244. 
 130. See 18 USC §1466A; 18 USC §1462; Irving, 452 F.3d at 110 (2006); Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d at 
434 (2007); Hoey, 508 F.3d at 687 (2007); Whorley, 550 F.3d at 326 (2008); Ryan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644, 
at *1 (2009); and Mees, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801, at *1 (2009). 
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certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of [the Supreme] 
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.”131  
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what materials are obscene by 
delineating which elements must be met in order for a material to be lawfully 
deemed obscene in Miller v. California.132  The three-part Miller test asks:  
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.133 
The chances that a jury would determine any visual representation of the    
sexual abuse of a child, whether the child be real or fictitious, to not meet the   
standards of obscenity is definitely slim.  After all, few other acts raise the same 
degree of condemnation than the abuse of children, especially the sexual abuse of 
children.  And, without a doubt, the fierceness with which we guard our nation’s 
children is something to be commended.  
But can it really be this simple to preclude pedophiles from finding refuge in 
the safeguards of First Amendment rights?  The answer is doubtful for multiple 
reasons.  First, if it was this simple, then what was the whole point of categorizing 
child pornography as a completely distinct class of unprotected speech apart from 
obscenity?  Why not stick with the original classes of unprotected speech - the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words - 
if it is sufficient to combat the sexual exploitation of children just by obscenity 
laws?134  One reason is because of the demanding impositions that the Supreme 
Court has previously placed on obscenity laws as compared to child pornography 
laws.135  For example, when it comes to obscene materials, the government is    
required to use “rigorous procedural safeguards” prior to seizing any material 
which it deems to be obscene.136  In fact, obscene material may not be removed 
from circulation until an adversarial hearing concerning the material is made and 
an official determination that the material is obscene has been declared.137  Just the 
contrary is true with child pornography.138  Since child pornography is provided 
less constitutional protection than obscenity, a prior adversarial hearing is not   
 ________________________  
 131. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973) (Brennan J. dissenting); see also Miller, 413 U.S. 
at 29 (agreeing with Justice Brennan’s assessment and noting that the absence of a single standard for testing 
obscenity has strained both the federal and state courts). 
 132. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 135. Slocum, supra note 63, at 695. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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required before the government is allowed to seize all copies of the suspected child 
pornography.139 
Additionally, while the Supreme Court has previously determined that an      
individual can be convicted for the mere possession of child pornography in      
Osborne,140 the Court has chosen the alternate when it comes to obscenity.141  In 
Stanley, the appellant was charged and convicted for “knowingly hav[ing]         
possession of . . . obscene matter.”142  The Supreme Court ruled that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments proscribe lawmakers from making the mere private     
possession of obscene materials illegal.143  The Supreme Court’s perspective on 
possession of obscene materials is perhaps most succinctly expressed by the Court 
when it quoted Judge Herbert of the Supreme Court of Ohio: 
I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene]         
literature by an adult should constitute a crime.  The right of the 
individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without 
governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to     
dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own  
private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his 
constitutional rights as an individual.144   
Therefore, under the reasoning in Stanley, using obscenity laws as a guise to 
prohibit virtual child pornography is insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers 
to proscribe simple possession of obscene materials.145  
As of yet, the implications of Stanley have been ignored as it concerns §1466A.  
The constitutionality of §1466A has, at least so far with the district and appellate 
courts, not been determined to be inadequate because it technically proscribes   
obscene child pornography from traveling through interstate or foreign commerce.  
Section 1466A(a) forbids any person from knowingly producing, distributing,   
receiving, or possessing with the intent to distribute obscene child pornography, 
whether a real or fictitious child exists.146  Each of these actions is deeply         
connected with commerce.147  However, §1466A(b) states that any person who 
knowingly possesses, even without an intent to later distribute, obscene             
pornographic material of children can also be charged with violating the 
PROTECT Act.148  All that is required by §1466A(b) is that the visual depiction 
acquired had travelled by any means of interstate or foreign commerce, including 
 ________________________  
 139. Id. 
 140. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112. 
 141. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. 
 142. Id. at 558. 
 143. Id. at 568. 
 144. Id. at 562 n.7 (quoting State v. Map, 166 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ohio 1960) (Herbert, J. dissenting)). 
 145. McLean, supra note 4, at 243. 
 146. 18 U.S.C. §1466A(a). 
 147. See 18 U.S.C. §1466A(d). 
 148. 18 U.S.C. §1466A(b). 
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through the computer.149  This is actually how charges were imposed on         
Whorley.150 He received the cartoons through an email.151  To say the least, this 
connection to commerce seems tenuous at best.  Does a personal email really have 
any effect on interstate or foreign commerce?  Furthermore, with our current     
dependence on technology and with the ease of communicating information over 
state borders, is it truly even feasible to possess materials which have absolutely no 
connection to interstate of foreign commerce?  It is certainly plausible that the  
Supreme Court would side with the arguments that these recent appellants have 
made, that a right to possess inherently includes a right to receive since it is nearly 
impossible to acquire a material without some connection to interstate or foreign 
travel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, with the Supreme Court having previously decided that the   
language in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which simply         
conveyed that an individual could be prohibited from producing, distributing, or 
possessing child pornography depicting an image which appeared to be that of a 
minor, the future of these portions of the PROTECT Act is uncertain at best.152  
The conduct portrayed in virtual child pornography is despicable and it is certainly 
hard to fathom any redeeming quality in such materials.  Nonetheless, as the     
Supreme Court originally noted in Free Speech Coalition, the original purpose of 
categorizing child pornography as a separate class of unprotected speech was the 
compelling government interest in protecting children.153  And since there are no 
actual victims in drawings or computer-generated images, then a statute            




 ________________________  
 149. 18 U.S.C. §1466A(d). 
 150. Whorley, 550 F.3d at 331. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See generally Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234. 
 153. Id. at 241. 
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